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Description  |
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BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
1. Field
The present invention relates to portable transaction cards such as credit
cards, check guarantee cards, identification cards, etc, which are of
generally conventional size and which have means for verification that the
holder of the object is an authorized person who has the right to use
them. In particular, the present invention relates to and provides such ,
i.e., credit cards, check guarantee cards and identification cards, which
have a self-contained means for verification purposes, with no external
reading apparatus or other peripheral apparatus being necessary for
determining whether the holder of the card is indeed authorized to hold
and use the card.
2. State of the Art
The use of credit cards, check guarantee cards and identification cards has
become almost universal. Transactions using such cards are common daily
occurrences in banking as well as other areas such as security and
identification. Credit card fraud has reached mammoth proportions due, in
large part, to the vulnerability of existing technologies for the
avoidance of such fraud. The prior art technologies have generally not
been successful for several reasons. The principal reason being that
expensive, cumbersome readers and other peripheral equipment have been
required in combination with various means employed on the cards for
identifying that the card is valid and that the holder of the card is
authorized to use the card. The cards, themselves, so called "smart
cards", have been expensive to produce and many of the systems which have
been proposed for the cards and readers have been unreliable. Because of
the expense and the unreliability, these so called "smart cards" have not
been used commercially.
Examples of the prior art technology are disclosed in the U.S. Pat. Nos.
3,831,119; 3,972,138; 4,100,689; 4,105,156; 4,408,119; 4,432,567; and
4,434,361. In all these disclosures, some type peripheral apparatus, such
as a machine reader, must be used at the point of purchase or other
transaction to verify that the holder of the card is authorized to use the
card. The various attempts to develop a system for preventing fraudulent
use of credit cards itself indicates that a simple, reliable and
inexpensive system is indeed desirable. The development of a card or
device which would be adapted to provide self-contained means for
verifying whether the holder thereof is the owner or is otherwise properly
authorized to use the card or device is highly desirable, and such a card
or device is provided by the present invention.
3. Objectives
A general objective of the present invention is to provide an object in the
form of a card, such as a credit card, check guarantee card or
identification card which if lost or stolen cannot be used for fraudulent
transactions.
A principal objective of the present invention is to provide a credit card,
check guarantee card, or other type identification card which is
relatively inexpensive to produce and which has self-contained means for
verifying that the holder of the card is authorized to use the card,
wherein proper verification can be established without the need of
peripheral apparatus separate from the card itself.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The above objectives are achieved in accordance with the present invention
by providing a novel and improved transaction card, such as a credit card,
check guarantee card or other identification card, wherein the card
incorporates therein self-contained means for verifying that the holder of
the card is or is not authorized to use the card. The card itself is
capable of performing and indicating the verification without the use of
peripheral equipment, readers, or apparatus of any kind. The verification
means which is self-contained within the card comprises a built in
keyboard for input of numerical data and electronic means contained within
the card for interpreting input data from the built in keyboard.
The transaction card of the present invention can serve the purpose of a
conventional credit card, with the additional benefit that fraudulent use
of the credit card by an unauthorized holder is made essentially
impossible inasmuch as the credit card is capable of self-verifying
whether the holder of the card is or is not authorized to use the card.
When the card is being used to make a purchase, the holder of the card
would enter a security code or personal identification number into the
card through the built in keyboard on the faceplate of the card. The
electronic means which is built into the card anlayzes the input data and
compare the data with the correct security code or personal identification
number held in the memory of the electronic means. If the data entered
into the card by way of the keyboard matches the security code or personal
identification number held in the memory of the electronic means, the
electronic means is adapted to signify that the entered data is correct
and that the holder of the card is authorized to use the card. If the data
entered into the card is not correct, that is it does not correspond to
the security code or personal identification number, then the electronic
means is adapted to signify that the entry was not acceptable and that the
holder of the card is not an authorized user. In the latter instance, the
person with whom the transaction is being made would refuse to complete
the transaction. In a preferred embodiment of the invention, the
electronic means incorporated in the card is adapted to illuminate a light
source indicating an acceptable condition when the correct security code
or personal identification number is entered into the keyboard, and to
illuminate a light source indicating an unacceptable or reject condition
when an incorrect number is entered into the keyboard. The two light
sources are built into the card, and could be colored such that the
acceptable condition is indicated by a green light and the unacceptable
condition is indicated by a red light. The cashier or other person with
whom the transaction is being made would complete the transaction only
after the entrance of an acceptable code into the card made in the
presence of the cashier or other person.
The card could otherwise have all the attributes of a conventional credit
card, and could then be run through the mechanical roller mechanisms used
in making a credit sales. Alternatively, the card could be used as a check
guarantee and protection card. The card would have the name and checking
account number engraved thereon. Once the holder was identified as an
authorized user, it would indicate that the checks having the same account
number as given on the card were indeed checks properly belonging to and
to be used by the holder. If the holder could not enter an acceptable
entry into the card, then a person to whom the check was being issued
would refuse to accept the check.
The embodiment of the card containing light sources indicating acceptable
and unacceptable conditions could be used to verify use in autotellers.
The autoteller would simply have to have a photoelectric cell capable of
determining whether the acceptable light source on the card was
illuminated prior to allowing any further transactions with the
autoteller.
Additional objects and features of the invention will become apparent from
the following detailed description taken together with the accompanying
drawings.
THE DRAWINGS
A preferred embodiment of the present invention representing the best mode
presently contemplated of carrying out the invention is illustrated in the
accompanying drawings, in which:
FIG. 1 is a front view of a credit card which incorporates the system of
the present invention; and
FIG. 2 is a block schematic diagram of the electrical circuitry which is
built into the card of FIG. 1.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE ILLUSTRATED EMBODIMENT
A preferred embodiment of the system of the present invention is shown
incorporated into a credit card 10 in FIG. 1. The card 10 is thin, flat
and generally rectangular as is customary. The card 10 is imprinted as is
known in the art to designate the name of the organization 11 which issued
the card; the number 12 of the individual card 10; and the name 13 of the
authorized user of the card. In addition the card 10 can be imprinted to
show the expiration date 14 of the card, and although not shown
explicitly, the card has a line for the authorized user's signature. The
signature line can conveniently be on the reverse side of the card. As
described thus far, the card is completely conventional and can be used in
conventional credit transactions or as a check guarantee card.
The outer appearance of the card 10 of the present invention differs from a
conventional credit card primarily in that a keyboard 15 is built into the
face of the card and two light sources 16 and 17 which are used to
indicate whether the holder is an authorized user of the card and any
transaction being pursued is acceptable or whether the holders
authorization is questionable and any transaction involving the card
should be rejected. The light sources 16 and 17 are preferably light
emitting diodes which are embedded within and form part of the plastic
credit card 10. Advantageously, the light emitting diode 16 indicating an
acceptable transaction is colored green, and the light emitting diode 17
indicating that any attempted transaction should be rejected is colored
red.
The keyboard 15 comprises a set of membrane switches built into the face of
the card 10. The membrane switches have recently become available and they
can be formed right in the face of the card. As illustrated, there are
nine switches in the face of the card 10, with the respective switches
corresponding to the digits 1 through 9. Although a zero digit switch
could be provided, it has been found that the nine digits 1 through 9 are
entirely sufficient.
Although not visible from the face of the card 10, electronic circuitry is
built into the card 10. The electronic circuitry in combination with the
keyboard 15 is capable of verifying whether the holder of the card 10 is
or is not authorized to use the card 10. The electronic circuitry is
adapted to compare a numerical input such as a security code number or
personal identification number entered on the keyboard 15 with the correct
code which is retained in the memory of the electronic circuitry. If the
entered data corresponds to the correct code, the circuitry is further
adapted to signify that the entry was acceptable, and if the entered data
does not correspond to the correct code, the circuitry signifies that the
entry was incorrect and that the use of the card for any transaction
should be rejected. With respect to the illustrated embodiment, if the
entered data is correct, the green light source 16 signifying an
acceptable entry will be illuminated, and if an incorrect entry is made,
the red light source 17 will be illuminated, signifying that any
transaction involving the card should be rejected.
A schematic, block diagram of one preferred embodiment of electrical
circuitry which can be used is given in FIG. 2. It should be realized that
numerous other circuits could be designed by those skilled in the art and
the circuitry shown is given for illustration only.
The security code or personal identification number is entered through the
keyboard 15. The code or number can be of any number of digits, but it has
been found that a five digit number is advantageous. The five digits can
be readily memorized by the authorized user or owner of the card, and the
five digit number allows a sufficiently large number of possible
combinations that it is highly unlikely that a person not knowing the code
number could, within any reasonable period of time, determine the correct
code from a systematic entry of all the possible combinations.
Each digit which is entered on the keyboard 15 results in a signal being
sent to the encode prom 20. The encode prom 20 forwards a signal to a
debounce delay 21. The debounce delay 21, as well known in the art,
verifies a valid key entry and prevents multiple entries which could
otherwise occur during the making and breaking of the keyboard switch
during the entry of the digit into the keyboard 15. The signal is then
forwarded from the debounce delay 21 to counter 22 and memory 23.
Irrespective of which digit has been entered on the keyboard 15, the
counter 22 will be clocked by that entry. The entry activates the memory
23 to forward both the entered digit and the corresponding digit in the
memory 23 to comparator 24. The signal of each keyboard entry also clocks
the memory 23 such that the next subsequent keyboard entry will activate
the memory 23 to send the activating signal and the next corresponding
digit in the memory 23 to the comparator 24. Thus, as a correct five digit
code number is entered into the keyboard 15, the comparator 24 will
receive five distinct pairs of signals. When the comparator 24 receives a
pair of signals which are identical, it forwards a corresponding signal to
counter 26. Upon receiving the fifth pair of correctly matched or
comparable signals, the comparator 24 will have then sent five signals to
the counter 26, and the counter 26 will have been clocked five times by
those signals.
The count decode 28, upon detecting the fifth clocking of the counter 26,
forwards a signal to the flip flop 29 which in turn activates the green
colored, light emitting diode 16. The diode 16 shows on the face of the
card that an acceptable entry has been made, and thus indicates that the
person who made the correct entry is authorized to use the card.
If a series of incorrect digits are entered into the keyboard 15, each
entry will clock the counter 22 even though the entry does not compare
with the proper digit from the memory 23. Thus for each digit entered, the
counter 22 is clocked, but counter 26 is clocked only by a digit which
compares with the proper digit in the memory 23. Upon entry of five
digits, the counter 22 will have been clocked five times. If of those five
digits, two were comparable with corresponding digits in the memory,
counter 26 would have been clocked twice. At this point, neither the
accept diode 16 or the reject diode 17 will have been illuminated. Upon
entry of the sixth digit into the keyboard 15, the counter 22 will be
clocked, and the count decode 31, upon detecting the sixth clocking of the
counter 22, sends a signal to the or gate 32. The or gate 32 then signals
the flip flop 33 which in turn sends a signal to the and gate 34. The
other input to the and gate 34 comes from the output of flip flop 29 which
activates the diode 16. When there has been no signal from count decode 28
to flip flop 29, the diode 16 is not illuminated, and the signal to the
and gate 34 is negative. The and gate 34 is adapted to invert the signal
from flip flop 29, and thus when the signal from flip flop 33 arrives at
the and gate 34, an activating signal is sent to the red diode 17. Because
of the inverted signal which is sent to the and gate 34, it can be seen
that if the diode 16 is activated, the diode 17 cannot be illuminated.
When the flip flop 33 is turned on so as to send a signal to and gate 34,
it also is wired so as to send a disable signal to the counter 26. Thus,
when the red diode 17 is illuminated, the circuitry leading to the green
diode 16 is disabled, and whenever the red diode 17 is activated, the
green diode 16 cannot be illuminated.
A timer and one shot system are provided for resetting the two counters 22
and 26 after a set time following either the illumination of the accept
diode 16 or the reject diode 17. Resetting counter 22 also resets the
memory 23 so that it will cycle through the proper issuance of digits in
the memory as it is clocked by the signals coming from the keyboard 15.
The timer comprises a time counter 36 and an oscillator 37 which is
connected to the time counter 36. The time counter 36 is activated
whenever either of the diodes 16 or 17 is illuminated. The signal from
flip flop 33 is forwarded to the time counter 36 to start the timer. The
time counter 36 is set to time out a given time and then to send a signal
to the flip flops 29 and 30 thereby reset those flip flops. The signal
which initiated the time counter 36 is also sent to flip flop 40, which in
combination with and gate 41, acts as a one shot. When activated, the flip
flop 40 sends a signal to the counters 22 and 26 which resets those
counters.
The timer and one shot circuits are activated whenever an output signal is
generated by flip flop 33. Thus, it can be seen that the timer and one
shot circuits are activated whenever an improper entry is made and the red
reject diode 17 is illuminated inasmuch as the output from the flip flop
33 initiates the illumination of the rejected diode 17 through the
inverting and gate 34. To activate the timer and one shot circuitry after
a correct entry of the security code or personal identification number on
the keyboard 15 has illuminated the accept diode 16, the signal from count
decode 28 is sent to the or gate 32. This activates the flip flop 33 but
will not result in the illumination of the red diode 17 inasmuch as the
inverted signal from the flip flop 19 inactivates the and gate 34 which
controls the red diode 17. However, the signal from the flip flop 33 does
activate the timer and one shot circuits. As can be seen, whenever either
of the diodes 16 or 17 are illuminated, the time counter 36 will
effectively keep the particular diode illuminated for a preset time, that
is, the time duration that the time counter 36 times out. The flip flop
will have immediately reset the counters 22 and 26, and when the time
counter times out, the flip flops 29 and 33 are reset, the diode is turned
off, and the card is ready for another cycle of operation.
When the card 10 is to be used for a transaction, it is preferable for the
holder of the card to enter six random numbers on the keyboard 15 to show
the clerk or person with whom the transaction is being made that the card
is operative and that the card will show an unacceptable condition when
the improper entries are made to the keyboard 15. This also resets the
electrical circuitry in the card so that it is in the proper state to
accept the next five digits and turn the accept diode 16 on when the
correct five digits are entered on the keyboard 15.
The circuitry contained in the card 10 can also be provided with means
whereby the owner of the card can change the security code or personal
identification number in the memory 23 at any time. This would allow the
owner of the card to change the code at any time that it was suspected
that an unauthorized person had possibly become aware of the old code. The
owner could, if so desired, periodically change the security code.
The circuitry necessary to allow reprogramming of the memory is quite
simple. It comprises an and gate 50 which is connected to the accept diode
16 and the encode prom 20. To change the code in the memory, the old code
must be entered from the keyboard 15 so as to illuminate the accept diode
16. A particular preset key on the keyboard 15, such as the number 9,
would be depressed. The encode prom 20 is adapted to sense this latter
entry on the keyboard 15 and sends the second signal to the and gate 50.
The and gate 50 would then signal the memory 23 so as to clear the memory
and reset it so that it can be programmed with a new security code. The
new security code would be entered into the memory 23 from the keyboard
15. This entry must be made during the time that the accept diode 16 is
illuminated. As soon as the time counter times out and the accept diode is
turned off, the card is ready for reuse using the new security code. As
initially manufactured, the memory 23 could be set for all digits to be a
particular digit, such as one, so that to initiate the accept diode 16,
that digit would be depressed five times on the keyboard 15. Upon the
entry of the five digits, the memory could then be programmed with the
desired security code or personal identification number as explained
above.
A battery source (not shown in the drawings) is supplied within the card 10
to provide the necessary energy necessary for the operation of the
electrical circuitry and the diodes. The numerous connections between the
battery and the components in the circuitry are not shown inasmuch such
connections are well within the skill of these artisans in the field and
are not needed to describe the operation of the circuitry.
It is to be understood that the present disclosure, including the detailed
description of the illustrated embodiment, is made by way of example and
that various other embodiments are possible without departing from the
subject matter coming within the scope of the following claims, which
subject matter is regarded as the invention.
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