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Claims  |
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We claim:
1. A method of cryptographic authentication of transmissions from a
transmitting unit to a receiving module,
comprising, in said transmitting unit:
separately generating a plurality of pseudorandom numbers;
concatenating said numbers to form a combined word;
performing an encryption operation on said combined word; and
transmitting a command word including a key portion derived from the result
of said encryption operation; and
comprising, in said receiving module:
receiving said command word;
performing a decryption operation on the key portion of said command word
to recover said combined word;
providing at least one number; and
providing an authentication signal only if at least a portion of said at
least one number is identical to a corresponding portion of said recovered
combined word.
2. A method according to claim 1 wherein:
said step of providing at least one number comprises separately generating
a second plurality of pseudorandom numbers; and
said step of providing an authentication signal comprises providing said
authentication signal only if at least a portion of each of said second
plurality of pseudorandom numbers is identical to a corresponding portion
of said recovered combined word.
3. A method according to claim 2 wherein said generating steps each
comprise generating a pair of numbers.
4. A method according to claim 1 wherein said generating step comprises
generating a pair of numbers.
5. A method according to claim 1 wherein said step of performing an
encryption operation comprises performing a linear encryption operation.
6. A method according to claim 1 wherein said step of performing an
encryption operation comprises performing a feedback shift register
operation.
7. A method according to claim 6 wherein said step of performing an
encryption operation comprises performing a linear feedback shift register
operation employing a secret feedback mask and said step of performing a
decryption operation comprises performing a reverse linear feedback shift
register operation employing the same secret feedback mask as in said
encryption operation.
8. A method according to claim 7 wherein said linear feedback shift
register operation comprises a number of iterations on the order of the
degree of said combined word or more.
9. A method of cryptographically authenticating a transmission from a
transmitting unit to a receiving module, comprising:
providing a starting number in said transmitting unit and providing said
starting number in said receiving module;
in said transmitting unit:
providing an iteration control signal which changes in a pseudorandom
manner in response to successive transmissions from said transmitting
unit;
performing a variable number of iterations of an iterative encryption
operation on said starting number, said variable number determined by said
iteration control signal;
transmitting a command word derived at least in part from the result of
said encryption operation; and
in said receiving module:
receiving said command word;
recovering the result of said encryption operation from said received
command word;
providing a second iteration control signal which changes, in the same
pseudorandom manner as said first iteration control signal, in response to
successive receptions of command words by said receiving module;
performing a variable number of iterations of said iterative encryption
operation on said starting number, said variable number determined by said
second iteration control signal;
comparing at least a portion of the result of said encryption operation
performed in said receiving module with a corresponding portion of said
recovered result; and
providing an authentication signal only if said portion of said encryption
operation performed in said receiving module is identical to said
corresponding portion of said recovered result.
10. A method according to claim 9 wherein said step of performing an
iterative encryption operation comprises performing a linear iterative
encryption operation.
11. A method according to claim 9 wherein said step of performing an
iterative encryption operation comprises performing a feedback shift
register operation.
12. A method according to claim 9 wherein said step of performing an
iterative encryption operation comprises performing a linear feedback
shift register operation employing the same secret feedback mask in said
transmitting unit as in said receiving module.
13. A method according to claim 9 wherein:
the same secret initial value is provided in said transmitting unit and in
said receiving module; and
said starting number is provided by performing said iterative encryption
operation on a word derived at least in part from said secret initial
value a number of iterations on the order of the degree of said word, or
more.
14. A method according to claim 9 wherein said variable number of
iterations is a fraction of the degree of said starting number.
15. A method according to claim 9, comprising:
providing a second starting number in said transmitting unit and providing
said second starting number in said receiving module;
in said transmitting unit:
providing a third iteration control signal which changes in a pseudorandom
fashion in response to successive transmissions from said transmitting
unit;
performing a changeable number of iterations of an iterative encryption
process on said third starting number, said changeable number determined
by said third iteration control signal;
transmitting said command word derived at least in part from the result of
said encryption process; and
in said receiving module:
recovering the result of said encryption process from said received command
word;
providing a fourth iteration control signal which changes, in the same
pseudorandom fashion as said third iteration control signal, in response
to successive receptions of command words by said receiving module;
performing a changeable number of iterations of said iterative encryption
process on said starting number, said changeable number determined by said
fourth iteration control signal;
comparing at least a portion of the result of said encryption process
performed in said receiving module with a corresponding portion of said
recovered result of said encryption process; and
providing an authentication signal only if said portion of said encryption
process performed in said receiving module is identical to said
corresponding portion of said recovered result of said encryption process.
16. A method according to claim 15 wherein said variable number is
different from said changeable number.
17. A method according to claim 15 wherein said pseudorandom manner is
different from said pseudorandom fashion.
18. A method according to claim 15 wherein said iterative encryption
operation is the same as said iterative encryption process.
19. A method according to claim 9 wherein, in response to the presence of
said first and second equal signals, the command portion of said recovered
new altered word is exclusive ORed with the corresponding portion of said
second new pseudorandom number and said steps (a) and (b), are performed
in response to the result of said exclusive OR operation indicating said
command is a synchronization command.
20. A method according to claim 9 wherein said iteration control signal
changes in response to the value of a bit position of a changing number.
21. A method according to claim 9 wherein said iteration control signal
changes in response to the value of a plurality of bit positions of a
changing number.
22. A method according to claim 9 wherein said iteration control signal
changes in response to the value of a bit position of said starting
number.
23. A method of cryptographically authenticating transmissions from any of
a plurality of remote command transmitting units to a command performing
receiving module, comprising:
providing a set of numbers in each of said transmitting units, each set
corresponding to one of said transmitting units, each set including at
least one secret initial value, each set essentially unique to the
corresponding unit;
providing in said receiving module, said set of numbers for each of said
transmitters to which said receiving module is to respond;
transmitting a command word from one of said transmitting units including a
key portion derived at least in part from an encryption operation
performed on said secret initial value; and
authenticating said command word received at said receiving module
utilizing the numbers in a corresponding set.
24. A method according to claim 23 wherein each of said sets includes an
identification number;
said transmitting step comprises transmitting said command word including
said identification number; and
said authenticating step comprises performing a process to authenticate
said received command word only in response to said command word
containing an identification number which matches an identification number
in one of the sets provided in said receiving module.
25. A method according to claim 24 wherein, in response to receipt of said
command word, said receiving module performs an authentication process
using successive ones of said sets which have an identification number
that matches the identification number included in said received command
word until either authentication occurs or all of said sets have been
used.
26. A method according to claim 23 wherein, in response to receipt of said
command word, said receiving module performs an authentication process on
said key portion using successive ones of said sets until either
authentication occurs or all of said sets have been used.
27. A method according to claim 23 wherein each set includes at least one
corresponding secret feedback mask, and said encryption operation
comprises a feedback shift register pseudorandom number generation
operation utilizing said secret feedback mask.
28. A method according to claim 27 wherein said shift register operation is
linear.
29. A method of synchronized cryptographic authentication of transmissions
from a remote command transmitting unit to a command performing receiving
module selectively responsive thereto comprising:
transmitting a command word including a key portion derived from at least
one encrypted number generated in said transmitting unit and indicative of
a command;
receiving said command word and, in response thereto, comparing a number in
said receiving module with a number decrypted from the key portion
recovered from said command word, providing an authentication signal based
at least in part on identity between said number in said receiving module
and said number decrypted from the key portion recovered from said command
word, selectively performing the command indicated thereby in response to
said authentication signal; and
rendering said receiving module unresponsive, following receipt of one
command word, to receipt of an additional command word for a period of
time on the order of one-half second, or more.
30. The method according to claim 29 wherein said rendering step comprises
providing a waiting period between the conclusion of any operation
responsive to receipt of one of said command words and the enabling of
said receiving module to be responsive to a subsequently received command
word.
31. A method of selectively cryptographically authenticating transmissions,
indicative of commands initiated by operating switches, from each of a
plurality of transmitting units to a receiving module, comprising:
providing a set of numbers in each one of said transmitting units, each set
corresponding to one of said transmitting units and identified by an
identification number, each set including at least a pair of secret
initial values;
providing in said receiving module the one of said sets corresponding to
each of said transmitting units to which said receiving module is to
respond;
in response to operation of said switches indicating a command other than a
lock-related command in one of said transmitting units:
providing a command bit;
generating a random number;
concatenating said random number with a first one of said secret initial
values so as to provide a combined word;
performing a first encryption operation on said combined word to provide a
first number;
performing a second encryption operation on a second one of said secret
initial values to provide a second number;
exclusive ORing a plurality of command bits indicative of said command with
the corresponding bits of said second number to provide an altered word;
performing a third encryption operation on the concatenation of said first
number with said altered word to provide an encrypted key word;
storing said first and second numbers as first and second pseudorandom
numbers for future use in subsequent authentication;
transmitting a command word including said encrypted key word, said command
bit, and said identification number;
in response to operation of said switches indicating a lock-related command
in one of said transmitting units:
performing a fourth encryption operation on said first number to provide a
new first pseudorandom number;
performing a fifth encryption operation on said second number to provide a
new second pseudorandom number;
exclusive ORing a plurality of command bits indicative of said lock-related
command with the corresponding bits of said new second pseudorandom number
to provide a new altered word;
performing a sixth encryption operation on the concatenation of said new
first pseudorandom number and said new altered word to provide a new
encrypted key word;
storing said new first and second pseudorandom numbers for future use in
subsequent authentication in place of said first and second pseudorandom
numbers;
transmitting a command word including said new encrypted key word and said
identification number;
in said receiver, selectively, in response to receipt of said command word
including said command bit:
determining if said receiver has secret initial values related to the
received identification number, and if not, terminating all response to
said received word, but if so:
performing a first decryption operation on said key word portion of said
received command word so as to recover said first number and said altered
word;
performing, on said recovered first number, a second decryption operation
so as to recover said combined word, comparing said first secret initial
value to a corresponding portion of said recovered combined word and
providing a first equal signal only in the event of identity therebetween;
performing a seventh encryption operation on said second secret initial
value to provide said second number, comparing the non-command portion of
said recovered altered word with the corresponding portion of said second
number and providing a second equal signal only in response to identity
therebetween;
then, in response to the absence of either of said first and second equal
signals, terminating all further response to said command word;
or otherwise, in response to the presence of said first and second equal
signals, comparing the random number portion of said recovered combined
word to a random number portion derived from a command word previously
received from said transmitter and, in response to identity therebetween,
terminating all further response to said command word, but otherwise, (a)
storing said random number portion for future use in subsequent
synchronization operations and (b) storing said second number and said
recovered first number, as first and second pseudorandom numbers for
future use in subsequent authentication operations;
in said receiver, selectively, in response to receipt of said command word
not including said command bit:
determining if said receiver has secret initial values related to the
received identification number, and if not, terminating all response to
said received word, but if so:
performing a third decryption operation on the key word portion of said
received command word, so as to recover said new first pseudorandom number
and said new altered word;
performing an eighth encryption operation on said first pseudorandom number
to provide a first new pseudorandom number, and comparing said first new
pseudorandom number to said recovered new first pseudorandom number and
providing a third equal signal in response to identity therebetween;
performing a ninth encryption operation on said second pseudorandom number
to provide a second new pseudorandom number and comparing the non-command
portion of said recovered new altered word to a corresponding portion of
said second new pseudorandom number and providing a fourth equal signal
only in response to identity therebetween;
then, in the absence of either of said third or fourth equal signals,
terminating all further response to receipt of said command word, but in
the presence of both of said third and fourth equal signals, exclusive
ORing the command portion of said recovered new altered word with the
corresponding portion of said second new pseudorandom number, performing
the command indicated by the result thereof, and storing said first new
pseudorandom number and said second new pseudorandom number for future use
in subsequent authentication operations.
32. A method according to claim 31 wherein said encryption operations
comprise linear feedback shift register operations.
33. A method according to claim 31 wherein said first, second and third
encryption operations employ the same algorithm.
34. A method according to claim 31 wherein said first and fourth encryption
operations employ the same algorithm.
35. A method according to claim 31 wherein said second and fifth encryption
operations employ the same algorithm.
36. A method according to claim 31 wherein said third and sixth encryption
operations employ the same algorithm.
37. A cryptographically authenticated remote control system in which a
command transmitting unit selectively causes a physical effect in a
command receiving module rendered responsive thereto;
said transmitting unit comprising:
a source of signals for providing first and second seed signals indicative
of respective secret pseudorandom number generator initial values and
first, second and third mask signals indicative of respective secret
feedback masks, each mask defining a respective feedback polynomial for
linear feedback shift register pseudorandom number generation, said
initial values and said polynomials being essentially unique to said
transmitting unit;
command switches operable to indicate a physical effect which is to be
caused by said receiving module; and
first signal processing means responsive to selected operation of said
switches indicative of a synchronization command for providing a random
signal indicative of a variable random number, for performing a first
linear feedback shift register pseudorandom number generation operation,
on a combined number consisting of the initial value defined by said first
seed signal concatenated with the random number defined by said random
signal, a given number of iterations on the order of the degree of said
first polynomial, or more, using the mask defined by said first mask
signal, said first polynomial having a degree on the order of the degree
of said combined word, for performing a second linear feedback shift
register pseudorandom number generation operation, on a second word
consisting of the initial value defined by said second seed signal, a
fixed number of iterations on the order of the degree of said second
polynomial, or more, using the mask defined by said second mask signal,
said second polynomial having a degree on the order of the degree of said
second initial value, for exclusive ORing a plurality of command bits
indicative of said synchronization command with a corresponding plurality
of bits of the result of said second generation operation to form an
altered word, for storing, for future use in authenticating subsequent
transmissions to said receiving module, first and second pseudorandom
numbers respectively indicative of the results of said first and second
generation operations, for performing a third linear feedback shift
register pseudorandom number generation operation, on a word consisting of
said first pseudorandom number concatenated with said altered word, a
predetermined number of iterations on the order of the degree of said
third polynomial, or more, using the mask defined by said third mask
signal, said third polynomial having a degree on the order of the
summation of the degrees of said first pseudorandom number and said
altered word, and for transmitting, to said receiving module, a command
word signal having the result of said third generation operation as a key
portion and including a command bit indicative of said synchronization
operation;
said first signal processing means responsive to selected operation of said
switches indicative of a lock-related command for performing a fourth
linear feedback shift register pseudorandom number generation operation,
on said first pseudorandom number, a first determined number of
iterations, using the mask defined by said first mask signal, to provide a
new first pseudorandom number, for performing a fifth linear feedback
shift register pseudorandom number generation operation, on said second
pseudorandom number, a second determined number of iterations, using the
mask defined by said second mask signal, to provide a new second
pseudorandom number, for exclusive ORing a plurality of command bits
indicative of said lock-related command with a corresponding plurality of
bits of said new second pseudorandom number to form a new altered word,
for performing a sixth linear feedback shift register pseudorandom number
generation operation, on a word consisting of said new first pseudorandom
number concatenated with said new altered word, said predetermined number
of iterations, using the mask defined by said third mask signal, for
storing said new first and second pseudorandom numbers for future use in
authenticating subsequent transmissions to said receiving module, and for
transmitting, to said receiving module, a command word signal having the
result of said third generation operation as a key portion;
said receiving module comprising:
a signal source for providing third and fourth seed signals respectively
indicative of said initial values and fourth, fifth and sixth mask signals
respectively indicative of said masks; and
second signal processing means for receiving said command word signal and
responsive to said command word including said command bit, for performing
a first reverse linear feedback shift register pseudorandom number
generation operation, on said key portion of said command word signal,
said predetermined number of iterations, using the mask defined by said
sixth mask signal, for performing a second reverse linear feedback shift
register pseudorandom number generation operation, on a portion of the
result of said first reverse generation operation corresponding to said
combined word, said given number of iterations, using the mask defined by
said fourth mask signal, for comparing said initial value defined by said
third seed signal with an equivalent portion of the result of said second
reverse generation operation and providing a first equal signal only if
they are identical, for performing a seventh linear feedback shift
register pseudorandom number generation operation on a word consisting of
the initial value defined by said fourth seed signal, said fixed number of
iterations, using the mask defined by said fifth mask signal, for
comparing a portion of the result of said seventh generation operation,
corresponding to the unaltered portion of said altered word, with a
corresponding portion of the result of said first reverse generation
operation and providing a second equal signal only if they are identical,
in response to said first and second equal signals, for storing, for
subsequent use, the random number portion of the result of said second
reverse operation and for comparing said random number portion with a
similar random number portion, previously stored for subsequent use in
response to prior performances of said second reverse operation, and for
selectively storing third and fourth pseudorandom numbers respectively
indicative of the result of said second reverse operation and said seventh
generation operation, for future use in subsequent authentication of
transmissions from said transmitting unit, only if said compared random
portions are not equal;
said second signal processing means responsive to said command word signal
not including said command bit for performing a third reverse linear
feedback shift register pseudorandom number generation operation, on said
key portion of said command word signal, said predetermined number of
iterations, using the mask defined by said sixth mask signal, to recover
said new first pseudorandom number and said new modified word, for
performing an eighth linear feedback shift register pseudorandom number
generation operation, on said third pseudorandom number, said first
determined number of iterations, using the mask defined by said fourth
mask signal, to provide a third new pseudorandom number with said third
new pseudorandom number and generating a third equal signal only if they
are identical, for performing a ninth linear feedback shift register
pseudorandom number generation operation, on said fourth pseudorandom
number, said second determined number of iterations, using the mask
defined by said fifth mask signal, to provide a fourth new pseudorandom
number, for comparing the non-command portion of said recovered new
altered word with a corresponding portion of said fourth new pseudorandom
number and providing a fourth equal signal only if they are identical,
and, in response to said first and second equal signals, for storing for
future use in subsequent authentication of transmissions from said
transmitting unit, said new third and fourth pseudorandom numbers
indicative of the results of said eighth and ninth generation operations,
for exclusive ORing the command portion of said recovered new altered word
with the corresponding portion of said fourth new pseudorandom number to
recover said plurality of command bits and for performing said
lock-related command.
38. A system according to claim 37 wherein the initial value indicated by
said first seed signal is different from the initial value defined by said
second seed signal.
39. A system according to claim 37 wherein said polynomials are all
different from each other.
40. A system according to claim 37 wherein said fixed number is equal to
said given number.
41. A system according to claim 37 wherein said first determined number is
different from said second determined number.
42. A system according to claim 37 wherein said feedback polynomials are
maximal length feedback polynomials.
43. A system according to claim 37 wherein said first and second determined
numbers each vary as a function of a respective pseudorandom event,
responsive to each transmission in said transmitting unit and responsive
to each reception in said receiving module.
44. A system according to claim 43 wherein said first and second determined
numbers are a fraction of said given number and said fixed number,
respectively.
45. A method of cryptographically authenticating a transmission from a
transmitting unit to a receiving module, comprising:
providing a starting number in said transmitting unit and providing said
starting number in said receiving module;
in said transmitting unit:
providing an iteration control signal which changes in a random manner in
response to successive transmissions from said transmitting unit;
performing a variable number of iterations of an iterative encryption
operation on said starting number, said variable number determined by said
iteration control signal;
transmitting a command word derived at least in part from the result of
said encryption operation; and
in said receiving module:
receiving said command word;
recovering the result of said encryption operation from said received
command word;
providing a second iteration control signal which changes, in the same
random manner as said first iteration control signal, in response to
successive receptions of command words by said receiving module;
performing a variable number of iterations of said iterative encryption
operation on said starting number, said variable number determined by said
second iteration control signal;
comparing at least a portion of the result of said encryption operation
performed in said receiving module with a corresponding portion of said
recovered result; and
providing an authentication signal only if said portion of said encryption
operation performed in said receiving module is identical to said
corresponding portion of said recovered result.
46. A method according to claim 45 wherein said iteration control signal
changes in response to the value of a plurality of bit positions of a
random number. |
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Claims  |
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Description  |
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TECHNICAL FIELD
This invention relates to pseudorandom numbers and cryptographically
encoded transmissions, such as the type involved with an automobile key
chain fob transmitter which opens the automobile door locks or trunk in
response to transmissions from the fob.
BACKGROUND ART
The art of encoding transmissions so that the transmissions may be
authenticated at a receiving module must meet criteria for technical
viability (security) as well as low cost and convenience. The cost and
convenience criteria result in an inability to use any encoding with
polynomials of excessive degree (such as binary numbers of hundreds of
bits). Furthermore, cryptographic processing must require less than one
second for acceptability by the user. Cost and weight constraints can
limit the size and sophistication of a microprocessor or other signal
processing equipment used in the system.
An example of such a system is disclosed in commonly owned U.S. Pat. No.
5,191,610 to Hill and Finn. That system utilizes linear feedback shift
register pseudorandom number generation having the same seed number and
the same, fixed feedback mask in the receiver as in the transmitter. The
number of iterations of linear feedback shift register pseudorandom number
generation are counted in both the receiver and the transmitter, there
being one additional iteration each time that a command is sent. Should
the receiver not recognize one of the transmissions (because the
transmitter was inadvertently activated at a great distance from the
receiver, or otherwise), the receiver is allowed a moderate number of
catch-up iterations in which it attempts to match the received
transmission. Should that fail, the transmitter tells the receiver how
many iterations from the seed it should perform in order to recreate a new
current pseudorandom number in order to resynchronize the receiver to the
transmitter pseudorandom number.
The aforementioned system requires that a receiver and a transmitter be
wired or loaded with a binary feedback mask at the factory and sold as a
pair. It also precludes matching a replacement transmitter with an
existing receiver without the involvement of dealership personnel, which
could compromise security. The pseudorandom number generators of the Hill
and Finn patent use one iteration per encrypted message. This saves time
but results in a certain level of correlation between successive samples,
so that the samples are less random-like. In other pseudorandom number
applications, the speed advantage of the aforementioned system could be
useful but for the inherent correlation.
Any such system, except one that uses a truly random number of infinite
degree, can be compromised either by analysis of a succession of
intercepted signals, or by a brute force, exhaustive numerical trial
approach which simply tries every number possible as the authentication
word (the code or key).
Coded keypads used for unlocking vehicles have inherent security features.
The generation of the code word by pressing keys can be shielded from
view, and is certainly not capable of being determined beyond a line of
sight. Furthermore, there would be great risk for an intruder entering
every possible number into a keypad in an attempt to replicate the code
(unless, of course, the automobile were parked in an unobservable area,
such as a private or otherwise vacant garage). Thus, the keypad cannot be
breached by analysis, and is not likely to be breached by numerical trial.
In contrast, lock systems which employ remote transmissions are enormously
subject to security tampering because the surveillance of the
transmissions may be carried out in another vehicle, without attracting
any attention whatsoever. Therefore, it is possible to record many
transmissions to a given vehicle, such as in a reserved workplace parking
space (which commonly contains expensive cars), as well as providing an
unobservable opportunity to attempt the breach of a security system (or
even several systems at one time) by broadcasting huge volumes of random
numbers, in parking lots where vehicles remain for long periods of time,
such as at airports.
Whenever a transmitter is newly assigned to be used with an existing
receiver, it is not sufficient to allow the new fob to identify itself and
become authorized, without limiting that activity to a time when there is
authorized access to the receiver through other than the transmitter
itself (that is, within the vehicle itself). Thus, access to the vehicle
by means of a traditional key or the like assures the safety of matching a
newly assigned transmitter to an existing receiver. In the case of loss of
synchronization between the transmitter and the receiver, simply allowing
the receiver to synchronize to a particular pseudorandom number provided
thereto by the transmitter makes it too easy for a surreptitious breach of
security based on the analysis of a few transmissions, and synchronizing
thereafter to one of the previous transmissions, utilizing numbers
expected to be successful based upon analysis. Mere obfuscation of the
resynchronizing code could be compromised by analysis of successful
resynchronizations, and determination of the obfuscation function. The
danger is not just that a single car might be broken into, but that a
sophisticated capability might be developed and thereafter utilized
extensively to breach the security of a large number of automobiles of a
similar type.
DISCLOSURE OF INVENTION
Objects of the invention include provision of an improved remote operating
system, the security of which is extremely difficult to breach by
analysis, in which analysis of transmitted signals provides essentially no
assistance in reducing the amount of numbers required for a numerical
trial breach of security, and in which numerical trial breach of security
requires, at a minimum, a prohibitively long time, rendering the vehicle
essentially secure to brute force numerical trial attack, and which is
useful only on a per vehicle basis. Other objects include rapid
pseudorandom number generation with minimal correlation.
This invention is predicated on our observation that introducing
non-linearities into the Galois field operation of linear feedback shift
register pseudorandom numbers can render a code very difficult to breach
by or with aid from numerical analysis. The invention is further
predicated on the fact that time constraints on authentication can render
the numerical trial approach essentially useless. The invention is
predicated in part on the reversibility characteristic of the well-known
exclusive OR operation, and on the reversibility of encryption such as
encryption involving linear feedback shift register operations.
According to the present invention, an encryption, such as a linear
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