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Description  |
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FIELD OF THE INVENTION
The present invention is related to the safe and secure operation,
transfer, and distribution of computer software and data. The present
invention addresses three major security problem areas: software security,
software physical security, and hardware security.
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
Security problems arise during the use of software in computers whenever
the host computer's architectural arrangement permits applications
programs to be copied and/or altered. Pirates, whether they are
"authorized" users or not, freely copy software for unauthorized sale and
use. Software theft has become a multi-billion dollar illegal industry
that is unstoppable by the prior art. Alteration of application programs
by other computer programs also causes major computer security problems.
Rogue computer programs called "viruses" or "worms" alter software to
produce unauthorized, undesirable, and often damaging effects. Such
self-replicating secretly-operating programs are most often transferred
from a rogue-contaminated computer into a new host computer by authorized
operators who do not realize that these programs have entered by means of
diskettes, modems or networks . . . and have attached themselves so as to
lie hidden in unused areas of the host computer's data storage and active
memory; integrated themselves into operating systems; and/or attached
themselves to other host-stored applications programs. Once inside, a
cleverly written rogue will pose a continuing threat from within tho host
computer, and is capable of compromising the security of anything that
passes through the infected computer to any other computer, since it is
able to copy, alter, destroy, and/or scramble any information that is
electrically accessible to any other program operating in the host
computer. As a result, rogue programs have been used successfully to
circumvent security programs for espionage, sabotage, and extortion.
Copying and alteration is enabled by the basic architectural arrangement of
prior art computers, which permits all host-run programs to have equal and
unrestricted access to all of the host computer's resources including:
mass data storage devices, console I/O; inter-computer communications;
computer peripherals; and any prior art security device attached to the
host computer. Typically, a copy of an applications program stored on a
mass data storage device is down-loaded into the RAM of the host computer.
Once in RAM, that program copy is able to be altered and/or copied to any
host resource, because the host resources are directly controlled by the
command coding of the program which is operating in the host computer's
memory regardless of whether the program in operation is a well behaved
program, or an insidious rogue program.
Mass data storage devices are an especially vulnerable resource, since
host-loaded programs are able to command any information to be copied into
RAM, altered or eliminated . . . including copies of other applications
programs. Computers are unable to determine the intent of a program. Yet,
no means is provided to prevent rogue-infected applications programs from
accessing information directly. As a result, any program operating in the
host computer's memory is able to avoid information-protecting security
software; run any other software while monitoring its operation; and
alter, copy, or destroy any information, (program or data,) that is
electrically accessible to programs having a different intent. Even the
prior art security devices and their controlling host-run security
software are subject to rogue attack, since they require the use of
secure, dependable host-run programs to maintain security . . . programs
that are able to be altered by other (possibly contaminated) host-run
applications programs.
To prevent rogue activity, a special architecture is required, wherein the
operating system in the host computer is electrically separated from
potentially contaminating applications programs, which are run in an
independent, isolated computer, so as to prevent direct access the host
computer's resources. However, the prior art does not provide such an
arrangement. As a result, only secure, dependable, well-behaved programs
are able to be used in computers needing security. This precludes using
any, even remotely suspect program. It hampers the ability to test and
upgrade software, severely limiting the ability to maintain adequate
security.
No provision is made in the prior art to run suspect programs in an
isolated architecture. There are no provisions for up-loading a suspected
program into the security device itself without compromising security.
There are no provisions for physical distribution of applications software
within a protected architecture and apparatus, nor does it permit the
actual operation of applications programs within the distribution means so
as to eliminate any need for down-loading software.
A rogue program hidden WITHIN A PRIOR ART SECURITY DEVICE that is able to
down-load information into the host computer, which in turn, is able to
become a part of host-run programming code is easily able to compromise
the information contained within the host computer. Such a security device
must be manufactured by a friendly source, and once wired in, it must
remain a permanent part of the host computer. Prior security devices do
not have provisions to protect from replacement with an unfriendly
"secure" program. As a result, the host computer is not protected from the
security device, and the security device is not protected from the host
computer.
Physical information security, that is, the ability to physically remove
from a computer all existing copies of sensitive information, and lock
them up in a safe or keep them under guard, is rendered moot by the
ability of host computers to make security-compromising copies of stored
information . . . with, or without the operator's knowledge. Means is not
provided for physical security so that the only-existing-copy of an
applications program is able to be physically removed from a host computer
and kept in a safe until needed, because such devices are able to leave a
security-compromising copy behind.
Processors, memories, inter-resource communications means, and component
interconnections are security-sensitive. If security-sensitive components
are physically accessible, unauthorized equipment is able to be attached
to circumvent security measures. Sensitive information in prior security
devices is not protected by dedicated security-sensitive components, which
are both electrically inaccessible, and housed in a single sealed
removable cartridge; so that sensitive information is protected no mater
what kind of a computer it is plugged into, or who plugs it in. Removal of
a prior art security device from the host computer does not remove these
security-sensitive components simultaneously with the applications
program, and other secret information, so as to enable physical
information security to be affective.
Software and other transportable information is not protected from
environmental factors that easily damage or destroy transporting
apparatus, and as a result the information inside.
Prior art security methods that use removable cartridges typically use
connectors between a host computer's data and address bus and the
information-containing cartridges. Such plug-in cartridges often spark or
arc upon insertion or removal of the cartridge from its socket. Such
methods become unacceptable in certain hazardous environments where
explosive gases, or a high percentage of oxygen is present, where a single
spark is able to ignite a fire or explosion. Such environments include the
use of computers at fuel depots, and in industrial environments where
computers are becoming common.
Even ordinary environments are hazardous to conventional computing
equipment. Diskettes and disk drives used for software distribution
contain delicate mechanical and electrical parts that fail in the presents
of dirt or moisture. The result is that, the prior art does not permit
such devices to be used in dirty, wet, chemical-filled, explosive, or
other hazardous physical environments, while simultaneously maintaining
software security. If the information-containing hardware is damaged or
destroyed security has failed, because the secure information is rendered
useless or inaccessible.
A related security problem arises during the use of computers which require
security. Prior connectorless data communications methods, such as those
that are used between some terminals and host computers, are subject to
eavesdropping by near-by equipment when electro-magnetic means are used
for the transfer of information.
Solutions to the above problems are not provided in the prior art as
indicated in the following examples.
U.S. Pat. No. 4,652,990 of Pailen et al. discloses a user access control
method, wherein a portable processor and ROM cartridge called a Key is
provided with a means for connecting the Key memory to a Key Carrier
Computer Bus, which is connected to a microprocessor within a security
unit called a Key Carrier, which is connected between a host computer and
a terminal to prevent access to the programs within the host computer by a
person using that particular terminal. Authorized users insert their Key
into the open bus structure of the Key Carrier. The host computer and the
security unit then exchange information so that the program in the host
computer is able to determine if authentication has been achieved. If so,
the applications programs are then permitted to be run within the host
computer.
Once an authorized user has been authenticated, he has access to
applications programs which are down-loaded into the host computer. Since
the Key's primary purpose is to determine authorization of those persons
who are allowed to copy programs, no protection is provided to prevent any
copying at all even by "authorized users". No provision is made to make
copying of applications programs unnecessary by containing them in
permanent ROMs within the Key cartridge. The authorized user is, as a
result, able to make as many copies of the applications programs as he
wishes . . . which enables him to become a pirate.
The Key system is lacking several features that prevent it from providing
protection from rogue programs operating from within the host computer,
and from copying by users, authorized or not. As is common in the prior
art, the applications programs are located in the host computer, and the
Key system is designed to simply prevent a user from accessing those
programs. An electrical and architectural separation is not made between
the security program running in the host computer and an isolated
dedicated computer for the applications program, so as to protect the host
computer's resources. The application program is not contained within the
portable Key cartridge, which is lacking a RAM to permit an application
program to actually run inside the cartridge rather than inside the host
computer. Instead, the Key system relies on a special Key controller
program that must operate within the host computer. This program
complements the program running in the Key carrier. It is this host-run
program that determines if authorization has been verified by the security
apparatus, and permits access to the actual applications program
down-loaded into the same host computer.
Damaging viruses are generally introduced inadvertently from a
virus-contaminated applications program being run by an authorized user.
Modern applications programs are quite complex, and even expert
programmers have great difficulty in determining for sure that a given
program is virus free, let alone the average software user. Since the Key
system leaves the applications programs, including the
security-controlling program inside the host computer, such programs are
just as subject to viral attack from a contaminated program operating in
the host computer, under the Key system, as with the rest of the prior
art.
A virus, once operating within the host computer is able to attach itself
to the Key controller program, record, duplicate or simulate any of the
communications between the security device and the host computer, or
simply permit access by an unauthorized person on a separate terminal.
Such a rogue program is able to extract security information from other
applications programs and permit their use, effectively bypassing the
security system imposed. Once the virus program has gained program
control, all of the host computer's resources are available to it,
unprotected by the Key system.
Since the Key cartridge does not prevent applications programs from being
copied by an "authorized user", the applications program is unable to be
maintained as the only-existing-copy of said program. If the Key cartridge
is locked up in a safe when the program is not being used, a thief is
still able to break in and steal the host computer with the applications
program inside; dismantle the computer; access the stored information
directly; and disassemble the security program to determine how to
circumvent it. The thief also is able to steal the diskettes or other
storage devices that said program has been copied onto. As a result, the
Key system does not provide for the physical security of applications
programs.
Additionally, the Key system is designed to cut off communications between
a host computer and a terminal. Many modern computers have discarded
terminals all together in favor of an integrated video-keyboard-computer
such as the IBM personal computer. The Key system requires a remote
terminal in order to cut off user access, and is as a result, not
applicable to many of today's common computers.
U.S. Pat. No. 4,521,853 of Guttag discloses a method for protecting
information contained in a memory which is on the same silicon chip as a
microprocessor. Peripheral devices are prevented from accessing the
on-chip memory through the common bus arrangement connecting the CPU with
off-chip memory. This apparatus is designed to function as the main
processor of the computer. It is wired into, rather than being an addition
to host computers of various types. A standard bus arrangement is used
that is not isolated from a host computer to prevent the addition of
security-defeating equipment. Host resources are not protected from a
rogue program being operated by this processor, as it is connected
directly by its bus system to the host resources in the conventional
manner. Rogue programs are able to gain entry into the host computer
because the applications programs are run inside that same host computer,
rather than within a secure cartridge and architecture.
Like the Key system referred to above, this arrangement does not provide
for the physical security of applications software, nor does it provide a
convenient and secure method for the distribution of software in a secure
cartridge. The device is not designed to be removed from the computer and
locked up in a safe at night, nor is the software protected from
destruction by hostile environments.
U.S. Pat. No. 4,328,542 of Anastas et al. uses wired-in multiple processors
that are designed for the implementation and secure operation of
particular parallel programming algorithms. The type of security provided
is to prevent interference between multiple applications by multiple
processors working on common data, even using common programs in common
memory. This method had been designed to operate using well-behaved,
coordinated programs written for parallel processing. This method does not
provide security in the sense that a not-so-well-behaved rogue program is
to be prevented from tampering with or copying information in RAM or on
mass data storage devices. This example of the prior art does not address
the problem of rogue-contaminated programs being down-loaded into the
parallel architecture from non-secure mass storage devices. The method
uses access authorization registers, an elaborate system of mating
hardware, and a specialized software structure to verify the authorization
of applications programs to be used in the computer itself rather than
providing a secure architecture with a separate processor and dedicated
memory to run applications programs. Host resources remain accessible to
all programs, including rogue programs that are able to gain entry by
means of contaminated authorized programs.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
It is therefore an object of this invention to provide a new secure
computer architectural and apparatus system for preventing copying or
alteration of protected information.
It is the further object of this invention to provide a means for the
distribution of software which does not leave the secure computer
architecture by being down-loaded into any other device. Said software
being stored, transported, and operated inside of the secure architecture
and apparatus.
It is the further object of this invention to provide a computer
architecture whereby applications programs are electrically isolated so as
to prevent direct access to host computer resources.
It is the further object of this invention to provide a computer
architecture wherein applications programs that are not originally a part
of protected information are able to be up-loaded into the secure
architecture and apparatus, modified, and operated; while still preventing
these up-loaded applications programs from directly accessing host
computer resources, or even the original applications programs
manufactured into said apparatus.
It is the further object of this invention to provide protection for
security-sensitive components within a single cartridge housing,
including: ROM and RAM memories, a dedicated processor, inter-device
communications, and an isolated memory control, address, and data bus
system to prevent the direct accessing of information in said protected
memories except by said dedicated processor under the sole control of
command instructions within said protected memories.
It is the further object of this invention to provide a means to allow
security-sensitive components of the new architecture, along, with
protected information, all in a single cartridge housing, to be physically
and simultaneously removed from the host computer and locked in a safe
during periods of non-use in order to provide physical security for
software and other information.
It is the further object of this invention to provide a means for the
distribution of information, including software, in an apparatus that is
less sensitive to physically damaging environmental factors.
It is the further object of this invention to provide a means for enhanced
computational capabilities by providing at least one additional fully
functioning secure computer which runs simultaneously with a host
computer.
The system consists of a specialized computer architecture and apparatus
having a specially selected portion contained within a special sealed
cartridge, together called an Independent Computer Module (ICM). The ICM
contains a fully functioning computer including: a CPU, RAM, ROM, a
specialized memory switching means, and a communications port for
providing a two-way communications link with a host computer, through a
specialized connectorless interface (rather than a conventional plug or
connector.) The host computer is fitted with a receptacle for holding the
ICM, called an Interface Unit, which contains a matching connectorless
interface, and a means for direct electrical connection to a
communications port on the host computer, and a means to supply electrical
energy to the ICM.
The ICM is inserted into the Interface Unit. The host computer contains a
program for communicating with the ICM that provides ICM-based programs
with host-software-controlled access to the host's various hardware
resources such as mass data storage, keyboard input, and video display.
The applications program within the ICM requests the services of a host
function by sending a function command, and any needed data, over the
communications link. The host computer responds by accomplishing the
requested function, in a manner similar to the way a conventional
operating system (such as MS-DOS) provides such services to an
applications program running in the host memory. However in this case, the
operating system program returns any required response to the ICM through
the communications link.
The operating system program does not need to authenticate authorized users
in order to provide security, since primary security is provided by the
architecture and apparatus, not by the software in the host computer. No
new programming methods are required. The above list of tasks required for
the operation of ICM-based programs is common to the programming art.
In the prior art, it is common to have a wide variety of outside devices
controlling computer memory, I/O, and even the CPU itself. Multiple
programs are commonly loaded into memory, each having complete access to
all of the host computer's resources. It is a major feature of the present
invention that the ICM is a fully functioning computer, separate and
isolated from the host computer, by the fact that there are no address or
control bus connections between ICM components and the CPU of the host
computer, or any other device outside of the ICM cartridge. Rather, the
teachings of this invention require a two-way communications link that is
always controlled by the cartridge-borne computer on one end, and the host
computer on the other end. The ICM provides this controlled information
transfer through a communications port, within the ICM cartridge. Control
wires for this two-way communications port are only connected to the
ICM-based CPU (other than conventional handshaking signals which only
indicate the presence of information to be transferred and do not actually
transfer said information into ICM or host memory.) This CPU is connected
to no memory, except that which is contained within the ICM cartridge. As
a result, the communications port will respond only to command-signals
from the ICM-based CPU, which is activated by no command coding except
those program codes which are contained in the ICM memory.
The direct result of this architecture is that ICM-based program commands
are the exclusive means for controlling: 1. information transfer into and
out of the ICM cartridge; 2. the addresses in ICM memory where input
information is stored or output information is taken from; and 3. whether
or not any such information ever becomes a part of ICM program command
coding. Because of this centralized control, a specific routine within the
ICM-based program to output or alter any portion of ICM-based information,
including program code, is the only method by which information in any ICM
memory is able to be output or altered. In the absence of any such
routine, no copy of said information is able to be provided to any outside
device. Likewise, no input information is able to become a part of the
ICM-based program code without a direct provision in the ICM program for
including such as a part of its program code. Because of the new
architectural arrangement, the ICM-based program is able to protect itself
from alterations and copying. Note that new programming methods and
electronic components are not required to implement such programming, or
operate such a port, which is similar in operation to the common RS-232
type port in a conventional computer.
Listed below are a series of benefits that are produced as a direct result
of this portion of the new architecture, and help explain why it actually
produces greater security.
ICM-based programs are unable to be copied out of, or altered within the
ICM cartridge without the use of specific preprogrammed routines that must
be a part of the coding manufactured into the ICM. Barring any such
routine inserted at the time of manufacture, ICM-based programs are unable
to be copied or altered. As a result, ICM-based programs are unable to be
pirated by authorized users, or successfully attacked by a rogue program
such as virus or worm.
The ICM architectural system provides security for the host computer even
from a rogue program that potentially is even able to be manufactured into
an ICM. Such protection is provided for the same reasons the new
architecture produces security for the ICM-based programs namely: a
separate computer for the applications program, bus separation, and a
host-controlled communications port. The host computer necessarily has to
apply the same programming restrictions, namely: information down-loaded
from an ICM is not to be used as program code within the host computer,
and host-defined secret information is not to be up-loaded into an
ICM--functions which are completely defined and controlled by the command
structure of the host software. If the host computer is designed to use
ICM programs exclusively, then the host computer is able to be kept clean
of any viral contamination, because all applications programs are run
inside ICMs rather than in the host computer.
The new architectural arrangement allows limits to be placed on ICM access
to important host resources such as mass data storage, so that only
information which the host operating system program is programmed to
transfer are able to be. For example, the host program is able to allow
the ICM-based program to read information from a disk file by name, but is
able to prevent access to stored information by track and sector, such as
a host-borne applications program is able to do. Such direct access to
mass data storage is a common way in which virus programs are able to
spread. By preventing direct track and sector access, the host computer is
safeguarded from this type of rogue program attack.
The host program is able to restrict file access by an ICM-based program to
authorized data files, and is able to prevent alteration, copying, or
unauthorized use of host-run software. This prevents the program running
in the ICM from circumventing any security provisions the host program
imposes by directly accessing the hardware. Because of this, security is
provided for both ICM and host. This method allows the host program to
limit the activity of potential rogue programs that are able to be
manufactured into an ICM, while protecting ICM programs from potential
rogue programs in a host computer.
The above listed benefits come as a direct result of the above-described
portion of the new architecture, but the exact implementation and coding
needed to accomplish the above procedure is already a standard part of the
programming art.
Another important portion of the new architecture is memory bank switching.
This bank switching arrangement consists of a division of the ICM internal
memory into at least two types of subdivisions called Executive Memory and
General Memory; each is independently addressable. A means is included for
selecting or not selecting the entire Executive Memory by turning on and
off all read/write bus access to it. Access is turned off by the ICM-based
CPU execution of a specific command from an ICM-based program. A latch is
provided for holding the off state until access is resumed (turned on) by
the execution of another specific direct program command from the
ICM-based CPU. However, the command control signal which switches the
Executive Memory back on is connected so as to simultaneously produce a
non-maskable interrupt, that is, a forced program control jump to a fixed
location within the secure Executive Memory. The two memory subdivisions
are able to be made up of both RAM and ROM, however the secure Executive
section has at least one portion constructed which uses a non-volatile
ROM, and a portion of the General Memory subdivision is constructed using
read/write RAM. This feature of the new architecture works harmoniously
with the other features of the present invention in order to produce
security results unavailable in the prior art.
The following sequence of programming events illustrate how this portion of
the new architecture is used to produce enhanced security. As in
conventional computers, upon power-up a restart signal initializes the
program instruction pointer register of the CPU to a fixed starting
address, where the initializing program begins. In the ICM, this fixed
starting address is in the security-controlling program in the Executive
Memory put into ROM during ICM manufacture. The secure program is then
running, having the entire ICM memory protected by its bus isolation from
the host computer, and available for use. Then, either because of a
function request from the host computer to the ICM, or because of a needed
of the secure program, a function command is issued by the ICM to the host
computer to up-load program instructions of another, possibly non-secure,
program. Up-loaded instructions are then written by the secure program
into the RAM of the General Memory section, but are not yet executed as a
part of any program instructions. Rather, the secure program issues a
specific command to turn off the entire secure Executive Memory
subdivision making the programs contained in it, electrically inaccessible
to the ICM-based CPU, and any program in the General Memory. Only then is
program control transferred to the up-loaded program. Upon completion of
the up-loaded program, a specific command is issued by the up-loaded
program, to turn the secure Executive Memory back on. Because of the new
architecture, an automatic, simultaneous jump occurs in program control to
a fixed address within the secure Executive Memory. The program coding
which begins at this address, is able to examine CPU registers to
determine if an allowable function request is underway, or is able to
terminate the non-secure program. Not allowable functions for which no
programming code is provided, include those requests which copy secret
information into GENERAL RAM, down-load secret information to the host
computer, alter secure programs, or transfer program control to a
non-secure program while bypassing the required Executive Memory turn-off
procedure above. If the non-secure program is terminated, then General
Memory RAM is able to be overwritten, clearing it for secure use once
again.
The actual program codes used to accomplish the above listed steps are a
matter of the common programming art, and depend upon the ICM-based CPU
type. But, the above sequence of events is required for the proper
operation of the invention, which will then produce these direct results:
Non-secure programs and subroutines are able to be up-loaded into the ICM
and run without compromising the secure areas of ICM memory, because the
secure Executive Memory is completely inaccessible to the ICM-based CPU
when in the off state. Secure programming is able to resume without
compromising security because program control is immediately transferred
to a specific security routine in the secure Executive Memory.
Secure-program-controlled communications are able to take place between
secure and non-secure programs within the ICM.
The same security which is afforded the host computer from potential rogue
programs in the secure portion of an ICM, as described above, is afforded
to the host computer during the operation of non-secure, suspect, or any
other program up-loaded into the ICM, for the same architectural reasons,
namely: an independent applications-program-running computer, bus
separation, controlled communications link, and selected programming which
does not include security compromising routines in the host program. The
host computer is able to prevent copying, alteration, or viral
contamination of critical software. The host computer is still able to
maintain its general purpose nature by running only the security operating
system used to communicate with the ICM, operating only ICM-based
programs, and/or by up-loading all other applications programs into the
secure confines of the ICM.
It is an integral feature of the present invention that all of the
security-sensitive components of the | | |
